Brief History
In 1984, the LaFarge cement plant in the Dallas neighborhood of Oak Cliff
announced it wanted to begin burning hazardous waste as a substitute for
natural gas and coal. LaFarge planned to get paid to burn other companies’
hazardous waste, instead of having to pay for conventional fuels that
provided the massive amounts of heat necessary to bake rock and make
cement.
It was very bad timing. Just across Interstate 30, West Dallas’
neighborhoods were still coping with the first rounds of scandals and
poisoning caused by the RSR lead smelter. Local residents were in no mood to
have another toxic industry start-up. Area Congressman Martin Frost
successfully passed a federal law that required cement plants burning
hazardous waste in cities of 500,000 or more to be subject to the same
health and safety requirements as commercial incinerators. LaFarge dropped
its plans, and eventually sold the plant.
In 1986, the North Texas Cement Company (then called Gifford-Hill) plant
in Midlothian, population 5000, began burning hazardous waste. It was the
first cement plant in Texas to do so. Because of a loophole in the law, it
did not have to apply for a full federal permit. Concerned citizens, who had
belatedly learned of North Texas’ plans, were denied a hearing because they
were one day late in submitting their petitions. So as not to arouse further
public outcry, North Texas called what it was doing “resource recovery”
instead of hazardous waste incineration. Whatever its name, the process
allowed the 1965 cement plant to get paid to burn the same kinds of wastes
as a commercial hazardous waste incinerator without having to apply the
health and safety standards of an incinerator.
At the time, North Texas was criticized for burning hazardous waste by
its rival down the road, Texas Industries (TXI). A TXI engineer wrote the
Texas Air Control Board and complained that letting an old cement plant burn
wastes containing toxic metals like lead was a very dangerous proposition.
State officials did not heed the warning. Unable to prevent North Texas from
burning wastes, TXI decided to join them and in 1987, its circa-1960
Midlothian plant began incinerating the very same kinds of hazardous waste
it had been warning the Air Control Board about a year earlier. It too
called the process “resource recovery.” And to make sure that citizens would
not even have a chance at a public hearing, the state agreed to TXI’s
request for a “permit amendment” that by-passed public notice or
participation.
By 1989, North Texas and TXI were burning tens of thousands of tons of
hazardous wastes at their Midlothian plants. To be able to burn more, both
companies decided they needed huge on-site tank farms to receive and mix
in-coming wastes. When they applied for their first federal permits to build
these storage tanks, the law required them to label their activity for what
it was - storage of hazardous waste - and publish notice in the local paper.
For most Midlothian residents, this was the first indication of what had
already been going on for three years. It is this request for a federal
permit from 1989 that is currently being contested before state
administrative judges in 1997.
TXI and North Texas were then two of almost 30 cement plants burning
waste in the U.S. - all in rural towns, mostly in the south and mid-west.
Another 30 were seeking permission to begin burning waste, including 4 more
in Texas.
In Midlothian, citizens mobilized against the waste-burning at both TXI
and North Texas. They attempted to get the two plants to limit the number or
amount of chemicals they would burn - with no success. Midlothian’s three
cement plants plus the steel mill TXI also owns account for anywhere from 55
- 65% of tax revenues for the city. These economic ties kept the local
government from getting involved in any reform effort. (Current Midlothian
mayor Maurice Osborne is a TXI employee.) Unable to move their own
officials, citizens concentrated on regional and state efforts.
Meanwhile, in response to public criticism from communities across the
country, the federal government passed a set of new regulations in 1991 to
govern the operation of boilers and industrial furnaces burning hazardous
waste. Although these were new regulations, they were still not the same
stringent regulations required of commercial incinerators and they did not
require a full federal permit. Instead, they created something called
“interim status” which meant the cement plants could operate indefinitely
without a full permit. In many cases these “BIF” rules, as they were
termed, merely institutionalized the inequities in the status quo. An EPA
whistle-blower released a memo showing EPA and industry collusion in writing
the new regulations.
At the state level, citizens and their elected representatives had been
stymied in their first attempt to pass legislation. They turned to the newly
elected governor, Ann Richards, and her appointees to seek administrative
policy changes. Richards promised the citizens action and charged her new
appointee, Air Control Board Chair, Kirk Watson, with the job of
recommending reforms. Watson appointed a task force with the specific goal
of reporting back to him on the issue.
This task force was the first and only one in the nation to examine the
issue of cement kiln incineration of hazardous waste as a policy matter.
Members of industry, including representatives of TXI and its suppliers,
were members of the task force, along with citizens, and neutral third party
participants. It was headed by a former Shell engineer and Republican
appointee to the Air Control Board. It met from mid 1992 to early 1993 and
issued a report that concluded: 1) Texas does not need the capacity of
cement plants to adequately dispose of its hazardous waste and 2) cement
plants that burn hazardous waste should be held to exactly the same
standards as their commercial incinerator counterparts. A
Republican-dominated Air Control Board, chaired by Watson unanimously
endorsed the report and it looked as if reform was finally going to
happen.
However, at the very time the Air Control Board was poised to implement
change, it was dismantled by the legislature and its duties assigned to the
newly formed Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission - the TNRCC.
Kirk Watson was not assigned a leadership position at this new agency and
his task force’s report was initially ignored.
By 1993, Texas citizens had fought successfully to end plans to burn
hazardous waste in cement plants in New Braunfels, Odessa and Ranger as well
as the Box-Crow plant in Midlothian. Moreover, North Texas had failed a 1991
“test burn” and had to stop burning hazardous waste - leaving TXI the sole
waste-burning cement plant in Texas.
It took until 1994 for the TNRCC - headed by three commissioners also
appointed by former governor Richards - to take the issue of cement plant
incineration seriously. In great part, this was due to the broad coalition
citizens had been busy building. The American Lung Association, local
physicians and PTA groups had joined the call for reform, has had every
environmental and public health group in the state. That year, Chairman John
Hall announced promises to “level the playing field” between incinerators
and waste-burning cement plants and began to draft new rules for the
operation of such facilities. In September of 1994, he issued a Commission
order outlining some of the parameters of this new policy - much to the
consternation of TXI.
November 1994 saw the end to all these efforts with the election of
Governor George Bush. Soon after, a directive was issued from the TNRCC that
declared state environmental policy would not in any way go further than
federal policy. In a reverse of previous policy, the TNRCC suddenly stated
it would perform the overdue “risk assessment” for TXI’s waste-burning
instead of having the company submit one. Changes were made to this risk
assessment, including the omission of a separate ecological risk assessment
that would have examined the effects of TXI’s waste-burning on local
ecosystems and wildlife.
Within a year, Governor Bush replaced all three Richards appointees to
the TNRCC. One of his choices turned out to be a former lobbyist for TXI who
had attempted to scuttle the new TNRCC reforms less than a year earlier.
Not surprisingly, the official state risk assessment in 1995 found
nothing hazardous about TXI’s operations. In 1997, the TNRCC proposed a
final draft for the permit TXI had applied for in 1989. This draft permit
ignores the Air Control Board task force’s recommendation and past TNRCC
promises to hold waste-burning cement plants to the same standards as
commercial incinerators. It will increase metals emissions by 800% and
dioxin emissions by 500% over current levels.
A widely supported attempt at state legislative reform in 1997 was shot
down in committee by Environmental Regulations Chair Warren Chisum at the
last minute. Sponsored by approximately 20 Democratic and Republican House
of Representative members; endorsed by the American Lung Association, the
Texas state PTA and local municipalities, the legislation would have
implemented the promise of a “level playing field” between incinerators and
waste-burning cement plants.
On May 20th, 1997 the hearings process for TXI’s new hazardous waste
permit officially began. Opponents of the new permit included the Dallas
Sierra Club, Downwinders At Risk, and local residents. Duncanville and
DeSoto have both contributed money for expert witnesses to ensure the
strictest permit possible. Despite efforts by TXI's opposition, TNRCC
approved a permit ....
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